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MEASURES TO RECONCILE
PRIVACY AND ACCESS INTERESTS
DANIELLE SIEGEL*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, courts across the country have confronted
a common scenario. First, members of the public and media request
records from a public university pertaining to its investigations of
sexual assault and misconduct on campus. Then, the media claims it has
a right to access these records under state open records laws. But the
university claims that it cannot, or will not, disclose the records under
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”).1
Finally, the media then files suit to compel disclosure.
This precise situation has occurred in North Carolina, Kentucky,
Iowa, and Montana—all within the past five years.2 Because state open
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1 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018).
2 See generally DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 841 S.E.2d 251 (N.C. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S.Ct. 1126 (mem.) (2021) (holding that the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill must
disclose to the press some disciplinary records relating to students who violated sexual assault
policy as a matter of state public records law); Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, 620 S.W.3d 43 (Ky.
2021) (requiring that the University of Kentucky specify which documents relating to a sexual

SIEGEL_12.21.21_FINAL_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

32

12/22/2021 12:12 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

records laws are one of the only ways to obtain information about Title
IX sexual assault proceedings, the conflict between the two laws often
involves sexual assault cases. Consequently, the conflict implicates
important public policy concerns. The prevalence of college campus
sexual assault has sparked national debate on how to vindicate the
rights of both alleged victims,3 and perpetrators and address the
underlying structural forces contributing to the problem.4
The conflict between state open records laws and FERPA in sexual
assault situations also raises several pressing questions for courts. The
most obvious issue is which law governs when the two conflict. A more
implicit issue, however—and one that courts have largely avoided
reaching—is how to articulate the interests involved on both sides.
What are the privacy interests in sexual assault records? What is the
public interest in access to those records? Do these interests conflict
and, if so, how can they be reconciled?
This Note will provide an overview of how each state has
confronted this complex legal situation. The merits of various state
approaches will then be addressed, with particular focus on a recent
North Carolina case, DTH Media Corp. v. Folt.5 This Note argues that

assault investigation of a professor qualify as “educational record[s]” for purposes of FERPA
protection); Press-Citizen Co. v. Univ. of Iowa, 817 N.W.2d. 480 (Iowa 2012) (holding that certain
types of records relating to an on-campus sexual assault may be kept confidential if releasing them
would reveal a victim’s identity, even if the victim’s name is not included); Krakauer v. State ex
rel. Comm’r of Higher Educ., 445 P.3d 201 (Mont. 2019) (determining that a student athlete who
was investigated for sexual assault by the University of Montana has an enhanced privacy interest
in his educational records).
3 See
Campus
Sexual
Violence:
Statistics,
RAINN,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-violence (last visited Oct. 12, 2021) (reporting that
thirteen percent of all graduate and undergraduate students experience rape or sexual assault
through physical force, violence, or incapacitation during their time as a student).
4 See Christine Emba, Our Endless Legal Debate About Campus Rape Misses the Central
Problem, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ourendless-legal-debate-about-campus-rape-misses-the-central-problem/2017/09/15/bf79d92c-9a4c11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html (noting that, despite the increased societal awareness about
the prevalence of sexual assault on college campuses, the issue persists, and “because it’s a unique
crime . . . even the most perfectly calibrated legal solution can never fully solve it.”). See also
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights Launches Comprehensive Review of Title IX
Regulations to Fulfill President Biden’s Executive Order Guaranteeing an Educational
Environment Free from Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC. (April 6, 2021),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-educations-office-civil-rights-launchescomprehensive-review-title-ix-regulations-fulfill-president-bidens-executive-orderguaranteeing-educational-environment-free-sex-discrimination
(announcing
the
Biden
Administration’s intent to overhaul the Title IX system).
5 See 841 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the University must “release as public records certain
disciplinary records of its students who have been found to have violated [its] sexual assault
policy.”).
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this case was erroneously decided, both as a matter of statutory
interpretation and legislative intent. Because the Supreme Court of the
United States declined to review DTH Media Corp., alternative ways
to reconcile FERPA with state open records laws will be both examined
and suggested.6 Specifically, this Note will argue in favor of statutory
amendments that either: 1) Clarify the privacy and access interests
involved, so that courts may balance them; or 2) Create an ordering
scheme that applies when a case implicates both FERPA and an open
records law.
A. Statutory Background
Before analyzing how courts have characterized the interplay
between FERPA and state records laws, it is important to understand
their respective mechanics—what they cover, the interests they
advance, and how they treat privacy and educational records generally.
FERPA generally prohibits universities and other institutions of
higher learning (“universities”) from disclosing student records with
personally identifiable information to third parties without written
consent.7 The law applies to “education records,” broadly defined to
include “records, files, documents, and other materials which—(i)
contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are
maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person
acting for such agency or institution.”8 FERPA exempts a few limited
categories from this definition, including certain administrative
personnel records, records maintained by a university’s law
enforcement unit, and non-student employee records.9 “Directory
information,” which includes basic data like student names, contact
information, and demographic information is also generally exempt,
though students and parents can opt out of disclosure.10
Initially, most courts faced with interpreting FERPA read the
definition of education records to exclude disciplinary records. In Red
6 Id.
7 Benjamin F. Sidbury, The Disclosure of Campus Crime: How Colleges and Universities
Continue to Hide Behind the 1998 Amendment to FERPA and How Congress Can Eliminate the
Loophole, 26 J.C. & U.L. 755, 757–58 (2000).
8 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
9 Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B).
10 Id. § 1232g(a)(5). See also FERPA and Access to Public Records, STUDENT PRESS L.
CTR. (May 6, 2005), https://splc.org/2005/05/ferpa-and-access-to-public-records/ (“Schools must
tell students (or the parents of minor students) what will be disclosed and give them an
opportunity to submit an opt-out form; for those who opt out, even directory information is not
to be disclosed.”).

SIEGEL_12.21.21_FINAL_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

34

12/22/2021 12:12 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

& Black Publishing Co. v. Board of Regents, the Georgia Supreme
Court held that records related to adjudication of alleged misconduct
and hazing within University of Georgia fraternities do not constitute
FERPA educational records.11 The court concluded that disciplinary
records are “not the type [the statute] is intended to protect, i.e., those
relating to individual student academic performance, financial aid, or
scholastic probation.”12 Consequently, it ordered the University to
produce the records in response to a request under Georgia’s open
records law.13
In Miami Student v. Miami University, the Ohio Supreme Court
similarly held that disciplinary records related to alleged student
misconduct do not constitute educational records for FERPA
purposes.14 Like the Georgia Supreme Court, it reasoned that
disciplinary records “do not contain educationally related information
. . . and are unrelated to academic performance . . . .”15 Thus, it too
ordered the release of requested records.16
B. Legislative Intent & Purpose
FERPA’s legislative history suggests it was primarily intended to
confer students and parents with a general right to privacy regarding
students’ educational records.17 According to Senator James Buckley,
the law’s principal author, FERPA was enacted in response to growing
concerns that educational institutions were gathering student
information without safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.18
However, FERPA’s lack of a private right of enforcement suggests
Congress was more concerned with systemic, rather than individual,

11 Red & Black Pub. Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 261–62 (Ga. 1993).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 262.
14 See State ex rel. The Miami Student v. Miami Univ., 680 N.E.2d 956, 959–60 (Ohio 1997)
(ordering a university to disclose the general location of the incident and the type of penalty
imposed on the student).
15 Id. at 959.
16 Id. at 960.
17 See 121 CONG. REC. S13,990 (daily ed. May 13, 1975) (statement of Sen. Buckley) (“The
immediate reason for the legislation was, of course, the growing evidence of the abuse of student
records across the nation.”). See also Sidbury, supra note 7, at 757 (“Buckley’s primary
justification for proposing FERPA was to control the careless release of educational
information . . . .”).
18 Phyllis E. Brown, The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act [sic], in EDUCATION
LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS, & DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 6:16 (Ronna Greff
Schneider ed., 2019) (“FERPA was adopted as a response to a growing nationwide concern that
there was not a provision to protect school records from unauthorized use.”).
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abuses of student privacy and confidentiality.19 Many courts have
endorsed this understanding, arguing that FERPA prohibits
universities from maintaining a “policy or practice” of releasing
education records without consent.20
Congress also enacted FERPA with transparency and access values
in mind. A major function of the statute is to protect an individual’s
right to access records pertaining to them. FERPA requires universities
to allow students and their parents to “inspect and review” their own
records.21 Thus, Congress intended FERPA to not only protect student
privacy interests, but to also promote transparency and access in certain
circumstances.
1. The 1998 Amendment
When Congress amended FERPA in 1998, it changed the scope of
the statute’s coverage, and further clarified that the statute protects
both privacy and access interests.
First, Congress explicitly addressed the issue of how FERPA treats
disciplinary records. FERPA was amended to allow, but not mandate,
postsecondary educational institutions to disclose information about
certain campus crimes and related disciplinary proceedings to third
parties.22 The amendment specifically provides that “nothing in this
19 See id. (“FERPA was adopted to address systemic, not individual, violations of student
privacy and confidentiality rights through the unauthorized release of educational records.”). See
also Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F. Supp. 684, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir.
1997) (noting that FERPA violations occur when institutions show a “policy or practice” of
releasing educational records that implicate privacy and confidentiality concerns).
20 See generally Matthew R. Salzwedel & Jon Ericson, Cleaning Up Buckley: How the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Shields Academic Corruption in College Athletics,
2003 WIS. L. REV. 1053 (2003) (citing the following cases: J.P. ex rel. Popson v. W. Clark Comm.
Sch., 230 F. Supp. 2d 910, 949 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (stating that “the fact that one teacher has a habit
of throwing out such notes at the end of each school year does not establish the existence of a
school-wide policy or practice of throwing them out”); Daniel S. v. Bd. of Educ. of York Comm.
High Sch., 152 F. Supp. 2d 949, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (stating that a single incident of release of
personal information is not a ‘“policy or practice ‘”sufficient to state a claim under the Buckley
Amendment); Jensen ex rel. C.J. v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1276 (D. Utah 1999) (“FERPA
was adopted to address systematic, not individual, violations of students’ privacy . . . .”); Bauer v.
Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (“FERPA provides for the withholding of federal
funds otherwise available to an educational institution which has a policy or practice of permitting
the release of educational records.”).”).
21 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (“No funds shall be made available under any applicable
program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying . . . the parents of
students . . . the right to inspect and review the educational records of their children.”).
22 See id. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an
institution . . . from disclosing the final results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such
institution . . . .”); Sidbury, supra note 7, at 756 (“In 1998, Congress amended FERPA to allow,
but not require, institutions of postsecondary education to disclose information about incidents
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section shall be construed to prohibit an institution of postsecondary
education from disclosing, to an alleged victim of any crime of violence
. . . or a nonforcible sex offense, the final results of any disciplinary
proceeding . . . against the alleged perpetrator . . . .”23 Thus, universities
may disclose the names of perpetrators, the violent or “nonforcible sex”
offenses they committed, and the results of disciplinary proceedings.24
They may also disclose the names of other students involved, including
victims or witnesses, with the consent of those students.25
These changes reflect a balance of both access and privacy interests.
On the one hand, as Senator McIntyre explained, “[t]he intent of the
amendment was to allow openness of school records.”26 Specifically, the
amendment was a response to concerns about universities using
FERPA as an excuse to not release information of public concern.
Before the 1998 amendment, universities could interpret FERPA as
allowing them to conceal information about campus crime and
disciplinary proceedings from the public eye. Many educational
institutions abused this interpretation and used it as a shield against
releasing information unfavorable to them.27 Congressional
clarification that “nothing in this section . . . shall prohibit” universities
from releasing disciplinary records was intended to curb this abuse by
clarifying that nondisclosure was not a statutory requirement.28
On the other hand, the Amendment leaves room for universities to
consider student privacy interests. The permissive language of “nothing
in this section shall be construed to prohibit” is key,29 as it clearly
indicates that universities are not required to disclose records of
disciplinary proceedings. The text of the rule easily could have

of campus crime to third parties.”).
23 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(A).
24 Id. § 1232g(b)(6)(C)(i). See also Sidbury, supra note 7, at 756 (“The information that
universities may disclose is limited to the name of the perpetrator, the violation committed, and
the result of the disciplinary proceeding.”).
25 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(C)(ii).
26 120 CONG. REC. S39,858 (statement of Sen. McIntyre); Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note
20, at 1064.
27 See Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note 20, at 1107 (arguing that universities could deal
with campus crimes as conduct subject to disciplinary board hearings, and could thus deny
awareness of and not have to disclose information about said crimes) (citing Maureen P.
Rada, The Buckley Conspiracy: How Congress Authorized the Cover-Up of Campus Crime and
How it Can be Undone, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1799, 1814–15 (1998).
28 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B). See also Salzwedel & Ericson, supra note 20, at 1071
(“[S]ince 1974, Congress has occasionally relaxed the law’s nondisclosure requirements,
particularly in the area of campus crime and student disciplinary proceedings.”).
29 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) (emphasis added).
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mandated or categorically prohibited disclosure of disciplinary records.
Thus, the amendment’s plain text clearly grants universities discretion
to either withhold or disclose these records based on any relevant
factors, including the sensitive privacy interests of students in sexual
assault disciplinary proceedings.
Ultimately, FERPA’s overarching structure reflects a balance
between two Congressional desires: Protecting student privacy and
promoting educational institution transparency.
2. State Open Records Laws
Every state has some version of an open records law that provides
public access to its government’s records.30 Generally, these laws create
a presumption in favor of access unless a record falls under a
specifically exempted category.31 Consequently, courts tend to construe
state open records laws broadly to include many types of records.32
Codified exemptions reflect a legislative judgment that there is either
no public value in the information contained in those records, or that
some other value overrides the public interest in access.33
Most state open records laws include an exemption for records
containing information that, if disclosed, would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy.34 Although state statutes define the
30 See Roger Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Record Statutes, 28 URB. LAW.
65, 65 (1996) (“While each state’s public records statute may be uniquely drafted, there is . . .
commonality in the approaches taken.”). See also STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., supra note 10 (“Every
state has a public-records law requiring state and local government agencies . . . to disclose upon
request the documents they maintain.”).
31 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. L. § 84 (McKinney) (containing a statement of policy that “the
public, individually and collectively and represented by a free press, should have access to the
records of government . . . .”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6253(b) (West 2020) (stating that all records
not falling within an exemption must be disclosed); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 140/3 (2019) (requiring
that each public body grant public access to requested records, unless within a limited category of
exceptions).
32 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Schweikert, 527 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ohio 1988)
(“Further, the law’s public purpose requires a broad construction of the provisions defining public
records.”); Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Child. & Fam. Servs., 87 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tenn. 2002)
(determining that public records laws apply to independent contractors who are working for the
government); O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 240 P.3d 1149, 1153 (Wash. 2010) (“In sum, ‘public
record’ is defined very broadly, encompassing virtually any record related to the conduct of
government.”).
33 See STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., supra note 10 (“Every state open-records act excludes
certain categories of records from disclosures because legislators have decided there is no
overriding public interest in the information.”).
34 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT § 24-72-204(6)(a) (West 2021) (permitting the state to refuse
to disclose records if it would cause substantial injury to public interest, including privacy harms);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-534(a)(2) (West 2021) (exempts records containing information “of a
personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted
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scope of this privacy exemption with varying degrees of specificity, most
courts interpret it with a balance-of-interests approach. Under this
approach, a court will first determine whether the information
contained in the records is private enough to overcome the general
presumption in favor of disclosure.35 Then, the court must weigh this
privacy against the possible benefits of allowing public access to the
records.36
Many states do specifically exempt all education-related records,
often through other statutes. For example, California’s educational
code asserts that “[a] school district shall not permit access to pupil
records to a person without written parental consent or under judicial
order . . . .”37 Florida law similarly provides that students have a right of
privacy in their own records.38 In yet other states, courts have been the
ones to determine that certain education-related records are exempt;
some of these courts have specifically found disciplinary ones exempt.39
The more common scenario, though, is that neither a state’s open
records law, nor any other law, expressly addresses education-related
invasion of personal privacy”); Young v. Rice, 826 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Ark. 1992) (explaining that
public interest must be balanced against a “clearly unwarranted personal privacy invasion.”); Dir.,
Ret. & Benefits Servs. Div., Off. of the Comptroller v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 775 A.2d 981,
987–92 (Conn. 2001) (determining that a state employee home address is private enough to
warrant protection).
35 See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 568 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Mich. App. 1997)
(“In determining whether the information withheld is of a ‘personal nature . . . the customs,
mores, or ordinary views of the community’ must be taken into account.”) (citation omitted);
Deseret News Publ’g. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 182 P.3d 372, 380 (Utah 2008) (holding that to be
exempt from disclosure, public records must invade personal privacy in a “clearly unwarranted”
manner).
36 See, e.g., Perkins v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 635 A.2d 783, 791 (Conn. 1993) (“[T]he
invasion of personal privacy exception . . . precludes disclosure . . . only when the information
sought by the request does not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern and is highly
offensive to a reasonable person.”); Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior
Ct., 165 P.3d 462, 477 (Cal. 2007) (holding the privacy interests of public officers generally do not
outweigh the public interest in accessing basic information like officer names and employment
status); Sarasota Herald-Trib. v. Florida, 916 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
public interest in open trials outweighs privacy interests in keeping victim autopsy photos
undisclosed); In Def. of Animals v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 112 P.3d 336, 347–48 (Or. Ct. App.
2005) (ruling that public interest in disclosure of staff records does not outweigh privacy interests
of employees when staff had been harassed in the past).
37 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49076(a) (West 2018).
38 See FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(2)(d) (2021) (“Students and their parents shall have the right
of privacy with respect to such records and reports.”).
39 See, e.g., Fla. State Univ. v. Hatton, 672 So. 2d 576, 579–80 (Fla. App. 1996) (holding
investigational records about student disciplinary proceedings containing student-identifying
information exempt from state open records law); Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 773
N.E.2d 674, 681–82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the Illinois Freedom of Information Act
exempts all files “maintained” about students and that “maintained” is a “very broad” term).
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records. This situation can be found in North Carolina, whose Public
Records Act (“Public Records Act”) defines public records as “all . . .
material . . . made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in
connection with the transaction of public business by any agency of
North Carolina government or its subdivisions.”40 North Carolina
courts have construed this provision liberally, holding that “unless
either the agency or the record is specifically exempted from the
statute’s mandate,” records created by the state are public.41 The Public
Records Act does not outline an explicit exception for certain kinds of
education-related records. It does, however, exempt records from
disclosure when “otherwise specifically provided by law.”42 Whether or
not this language implies FERPA is unclear.
C. The Question of Preemption
When cases arise that implicate open records laws and student
records, courts are left to evaluate what records can and should be
released, and how FERPA factors into the analysis. This evaluation
requires courts to engage in preemption analysis.
Rooted in the Supremacy Clause, preemption doctrine mandates
that if state law conflicts with federal law that regulates the same kind
of conduct, federal law prevails.43 There are a few ways that a federal
law might preempt a conflicting state law. The first is conflict
preemption, which exists where “compliance with both state and
federal law is impossible, or where the state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”44 The second form of preemption is referred to
as field preemption, in which “Congress has forbidden the State to take
action in the field that the federal statute [preempts].”45
Accordingly, when a court addresses a case seemingly governed by
both FERPA and a state’s open records law, it must decide if the
situation is covered by conflict or field preemption, or if the statutes do
40 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132–1(a) (West 1995).
41 DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 841 S.E.2d 251, 258 (N.C. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1126
(mem.) (2021) (quoting Times-News Pub. Co. v. State, 476 S.E.2d 450, 452 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)).
42 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132–1(b) (West 1995).
43 See Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S.Ct. 791, 801 (2020) (“The Supremacy Clause provides that
the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties constitute the supreme Law of the Land . . . . [and]
provides a rule of decision for determining whether federal or state law applies in a particular
situation.”) (internal quotations omitted).
44 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (citing California v. ARC America
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)).
45 Id.
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not conflict at all.
I. HOW NORTH CAROLINA APPROACHED THE INTERSECTION
BETWEEN FERPA AND ITS OPEN RECORDS LAW
In 2020, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided whether
FERPA preempts the Public Records Act in DTH Media Corp. v. Folt.46
Plaintiff The Daily Tar Heel, the student newspaper at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“UNC”), sought administrative
records of Title IX proceedings identifying students found responsible
for sexual misconduct.47 The requests sought information describing
the nature of the sexual misconduct and punishments enforced by the
University.48 Citing FERPA, UNC refused to turn the records over.49
The University argued that FERPA’s provision on sexual assault
disciplinary proceedings gives it discretion to not disclose the names of
students found guilty, specific violation(s) committed, and sanction(s)
imposed.50 UNC then argued that, in exercising this statutorilyconferred discretion, it properly concluded that releasing the records
would “lead to the identification of victims, jeopardize the safety of the
University’s students, violate student privacy, and undermine the
University’s efforts to comply with Title IX.”51 This federallyauthorized discretion, UNC reasoned, preempts any disclosure
obligations it may have under the Public Records Act.52
The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed. First, it held that, as
a matter of statutory construction, FERPA does not give UNC the
discretion to withhold disciplinary records of this nature. The court
noted that there is “no express provision in FERPA” that grants a
university discretion to withhold the information sought by The Daily
Tar Heel.53 It then rejected the proposition that such discretion can be
inferred from FERPA’s language that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit an institution . . . from disclosing the final results
of any disciplinary proceeding . . . against . . . an alleged perpetrator of .

46 See 841 S.E.2d 251, 263 (N.C. 2020) (holding preemption doctrine inapplicable in the
case before the court).
47 Id. at 254.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 258.
51 Id.
52 See 841 S.E.2d 251, 254 (N.C. 2020)
53 Id. at 258.
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. . a non-forcible sex offense.”54
Instead, the court read this language to be mandatory and to specify
a category of records subject to disclosure: disciplinary records related
to sexual assaults.55 The court cited as further evidence the FERPA
section which provides that “final results” of any disciplinary
proceeding “shall include only the name of the student, the violation
committed, and any sanction imposed by the institution on that
student.”56
Finding that this language creates a category of records subject to
mandatory disclosure, the court held that FERPA does not conflict
with the Open Records Act.57 Indeed, the court noted that the Open
Records Act has been “interpreted consistently . . . as intended for
liberal construction affording ready access to public records . . . .”58
Accordingly, preemption was unnecessary, because both statutes
mandated disclosure of the requested records.59
A. What the North Carolina Supreme Court Got Wrong
The North Carolina Supreme Court erroneously decided DTH
Media Corp. v. Folt. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the court
failed on two main fronts: It misread FERPA’s plain language and
misunderstood its purpose.
1. Plain Language
First, the court misread the plain meaning of FERPA’s text.60
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit [a university]
from disclosing the final results of any disciplinary proceeding” is not

54 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B); DTH Media Corp., 841 S.E.2d at 259.
55 See 841 S.E.2d at 257, 259 (“We conclude that . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B) did not
grant implied discretion . . . to determine whether to release the results of a student disciplinary
proceeding emanating from rape, sexual assault, or sexual misconduct charges in absence of
language expressly granting such discretion.”).
56 See id. at 260 (finding that because the statute does not expressly mention disclosure of
offense dates, such dates do not mandatorily need to be disclosed).
57 See id. at 259 (“Since FERPA contains no such [permissive] language, but instead
specifies that the categories of records sought here are . . . subject to disclosure . . . we see no
conflict between the federal statute and the state Public Records Act.”).
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (stating that analysis of
statutory construction begins with the language of the statute); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (explaining that if the statutory language has a “plain and unambiguous
meaning,” the inquiry ends with the text).
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mandatory language.61 To prohibit is to “officially forbid” something.62
Congress simply stated that nothing shall officially get in a university’s
way of disclosing disciplinary records. This has a different meaning than
to affirmatively require universities to disclose such records. To require
is to “make it officially necessary for someone to do something.”63 If
Congress intended FERPA to require disclosure of disciplinary records
related to sexual assault proceedings, it more likely would have used
language like ‘universities must disclose,’ or ‘universities are required
to disclose.’64 Absent such language, the best reading of “nothing shall
prohibit” is that nothing in FERPA officially prevents or forbids
universities from releasing disciplinary records. The logical conclusion
from this reading, then, is that FERPA leaves the choice to disclose to
the universities themselves. The court even recognizes this distinction,
if only implicitly, later in the opinion when it describes the provision as
“allow[ing] disclosure.”65 Allowing is simply not the same thing as
requiring disclosure.
The court also misread the text providing that “the final results of
any disciplinary proceeding shall include only the name of the student,
the violation committed, and any sanction imposed by the institution
on that student.”66 Nothing in this language creates a mandatory
obligation on the part of a university to disclose disciplinary records as
a general category. Rather, it is merely a definitional provision that
clarifies that when universities decide to release disciplinary records,
FERPA limits disclosure to three types of information.
2. Statutory Purpose
Second, the North Carolina Supreme Court erred by not looking to
the overall design and purpose of FERPA, which confirms university
discretion to release sexual assault disciplinary records.67 FERPA is a
61 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B).
ACAD.
CONTENT
DICTIONARY,
62 Prohibit,
CAMBRIDGE
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/prohibit (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
BUS.
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
63 Require,
CAMBRIDGE
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/require (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
64 See W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (stating that the best evidence
of Congressional purpose is statutory text).
65 DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 841 S.E.2d 251, 259 (N.C. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1126
(mem.) (2021).
66 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B).
67 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1943)
(“[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose,
[and] will read text in the light of context . . . so as to carry out . . . the generally expressed
legislative policy.”).
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protective statute; its provisions are designed to prevent disclosure of
student information to third parties without student or parental
consent.68 It does contain a few exceptions, including for personnel
records and basic “directory information” such as addresses.69 But even
among these exemptions, the only one that directly covers information
about students—the directory information one—includes an opt-out
provision.70 This statutory context illustrates that the “overall design”
of FERPA is primarily aimed at keeping sensitive student information
from public view absent consent.71 The North Carolina Supreme
Court’s reading requiring mandatory disclosure of disciplinary records
is totally inconsistent with this overarching protective statutory
scheme.72
B. Alternative Paths the Court Could Have Taken
Had the court properly interpreted FERPA’s disciplinary records
provision, it could have taken two different approaches to solving the
issue in the case. Neither approach warrants the decision that UNC had
to disclose the disciplinary records in their entirety.
First, the court could have found a conflict between FERPA and
the Open Records Act. Treating FERPA as a protective statute and
reading the disciplinary records provision in light of that design
conflicts with the overall design and purpose of the Open Records Act.
Again, the court stated that North Carolina courts have “consistently”
interpreted the latter as “intended for liberal construction affording
ready access to public records, subject to limited exceptions.”73 In other
words, the Open Records Act is a mandatory disclosure statute
designed to facilitate the release of government information. This
interpretation conflicts with FERPA, a protective statute specifically
designed to prevent disclosure of student records as a matter of federal

68 See supra note 17 (discussing the policy concerns behind FERPA’s introduction).
69 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i)–(5)(A).
70 Id. § 1232g(a)(5)(B).
71 320 U.S. at 350–51.
72 The weight of academic authority also supports a permissive reading of FERPA’s
provision regarding sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding records. See, e.g., Sidbury, supra
note 7, at 757 (“The language of [the 1998 FERPA amendment] leaves this determination to the
discretion of the institution.”); Emma B. Bolla, The Assault on Campus Assault: The Conflicts
Between Local Law Enforcement, FERPA, and Title IX, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1382 (2019)
(describing the “current permissive standard of [disclosure]” as per FERPA).
73 DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 841 S.E.2d 251, 259 (N.C. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1126
(mem.) (2021).
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policy.74 In this case, FERPA preempts North Carolina law as per the
Supremacy Clause.75 Consequently, there would be no legal basis for
ordering UNC to release the records.
The second route is actually one that the court took, but did so
improperly. Courts routinely try to construe statutes to avoid finding
direct, irreconcilable conflicts of interpretation. Indeed, the court cited
the canon: “Statutes in pari materia must be harmonized, ‘to give effect,
if possible,’ to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the
statutes involved.”76 The court then reasoned that its understanding of
FERPA “reconciles and harmonizes” it with state law because both
require mandatory disclosure of disciplinary records.77 Yet, this
approach completely ignored FERPA’s main purpose: to protect
student privacy absent consent.78 Contrary to the court’s intent, there
was no “harmonization” because the court did not give effect to “all”
relevant provisions and “destroy[ed] the meaning” of one of the two
statutes at issue.
Instead, the court should have acknowledged that FERPA is
generally designed as a protective statute, but that it also discourages
institutional secrecy.79 Under this reading, the protective parts of
FERPA may be in tension with the Open Records Act, but the statutes
are not completely irreconcilable. The court could have found that both
laws require universities to release records of sexual assault and
misconduct proceedings to the extent that doing so would not reveal
any information that jeopardizes the privacy interests of individual
students. For example, the court could have read both laws as requiring
UNC to disclose records showing what punishments students got for
which violations, with redactions of information harmful to the named
students. This could have harmonized FERPA’s role as a protective
statute, and its interest in promoting institutional openness, with the
Open Records Act’s general presumption in favor of disclosure.
74 See supra note 17 (explaining the reasons behind FERPA’s introduction).
75 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
76 841 S.E.2d at 257 (citing Carter-Hubbard Publ’g Co. v. WRMC Hosp. Operating Corp.,
633 S.E.2d 682, 685 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 641 S.E.2d 301 (N.C. 2007)).
77 See id. at 259 (holding that records at issue were, by mandate, subject to disclosure).
78 See Sidbury, supra note 7, at 757–58 (describing Senator Buckley’s main justification for
FERPA as to control the careless release of educational information). See also SCHNEIDER, supra
note 18, at § 6:16 (describing FERPA as establishing “principally a right to privacy of educational
records.”).
79 See 120 CONG. REC. S39,858 (statement of Sen. McIntyre) (“The intent of the
amendment was to allow openness of school records.”).
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II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES—HOW OTHER STATES HAVE
MORE APPROPRIATELY DEALT WITH THE INTERSECTION OF
FERPA AND OPEN RECORDS LAWS
Courts in other states (as well as some federal courts) have
addressed potential conflict between FERPA and open records laws
differently from the DTH Media Corp. decision.
In Press-Citizen Co. v. University of Iowa, the Supreme Court of
Iowa faced a similar fact pattern as that faced by the North Carolina
Supreme Court.80 In this case, the student newspaper at the University
of Iowa requested records related to alleged sexual assaults under the
Iowa Open Records Act.81 The Supreme Court of Iowa reconciled this
state law with FERPA by limiting disclosure to redacted records that
do not disclose personally-identifying information.82 The court also
held that it may be consistent with both statutes to withhold records
entirely where the requester would otherwise know the identity of the
involved student(s), despite redactions.83 The court believed this
approach was consistent with both the Iowa Open Records Act and
FERPA’s overarching purpose of student confidentiality protection.84
Other courts have deployed a balance-of-interests analysis. For
instance, the Ohio Supreme Court did so in State ex rel. The Miami
Student v. Miami University.85 There, the Miami University student
newspaper requested student disciplinary records from the
administration to report on campus crime trends.86 The administration
first refused to release the records.87 After an Ohio Public Records Act
request, the University released them but, citing FERPA, redacted “the
identity, sex, and age of the accused, as well as the date, time and
location of the incidents . . . .”88 The court acknowledged both interests
80 See 817 N.W.2d 480, 492 (Iowa 2012) (permitting redactions to protect a victim’s
identity).
81 Id. at 482–83.
82 Id. at 492.
83 Id. The trial court reviewed the contested records in camera to make determinations
about what needed to be redacted, and about whether the requester would be able to identify the
students even with redactions. Id. at 482.
84 See id. at 492 (stating that the overarching goal of FERPA, protecting student
confidentiality, was paramount even when considering state law).
85 State ex rel. The Miami Student v. Miami Univ., 680 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1997).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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at play, the “fundamental policy of promoting open government”
underscoring Ohio’s Public Records Act, and FERPA’s goal of
protecting private student information from disclosure.89 It ultimately
found that the University releasing the disciplinary records but
redacting certain identifiable information that could put student safety
and privacy at risk was an appropriate way to balance these competing
interests.90
The Montana Supreme Court took a similar approach in recent
cases involving disciplinary records that addressed alleged sexual
assaults near the University of Montana campus. In Krakauer v. State
by and Through Christian, the court held that FERPA’s prohibition of
unilateral disclosure of personally-identifying information applies
when journalists seek records under the Montana Constitution’s right
of access to public records.91 The Montana Supreme Court remanded
the case and ordered the district court to: 1) Conduct an in camera
review of the requested records; and 2) Balance the students’
“enhanced” privacy interests with the public’s constitutional right of
access in determining whether the records may be released.92
On remand, the district court found that the journalist’s interest in
accessing the records outweighed students’ privacy interests. The
Montana Supreme Court, reviewing the appeal from that remand,
disagreed. It reasoned that: 1) The student named in the records
demonstrated an actual privacy interest in his disciplinary records; 2)
There is a social interest in recognizing a reasonable student’s actual
privacy interest; 3) Redaction of personally-identifiable information in
some situations would be futile; and 4) The student’s demand for
individual privacy outweighs the public interest in disclosure.93

89 Id. at 958–59.
90 See id (ruling that the University could have redacted even more categories of student
information to protect student safety and privacy). .
91 381 P.3d 524, 536 (Mont. 2016).
92 Id. at 533–34 (“In the context of this particular case . . . the national and state legislatures
have taken the affirmative action of enacting legislation establishing the privacy interests of
students in their records, as a matter of law. This action sets this case apart from others involving
general privacy interests, and courts must honor the unique privacy protection legislatively
cloaked around the subject records by factoring that enhanced privacy interest into the balancing
test.”).
93 Krakauer v. State ex rel. Comm’r of Higher Educ., 445 P.3d 201, 207, 212 (Mont. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 1107 (mem.) (2020) (“[A] court must still determine whether a student has
an actual privacy interest in his records based on the facts of the case. Where the court finds the
privacy interest exists, robust protection in favor of individual privacy [exists too] . . . .”).
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III. FINDING A SOLUTION—HOW TO BEST RECONCILE STUDENT
PRIVACY WITH PUBLIC ACCESS INTERESTS
Though the most effective way to reconcile FERPA with state open
records laws is through United States Supreme Court clarification, the
Court recently denied UNC’s petition for certiorari.94 Yet, as UNC
pointed out in its petition and as this discussion has illustrated, many
courts across the country have confronted the difficult question of how
to reconcile FERPA with state open records laws.95 Those courts have
reached very different decisions based on different methodologies and
rationales.
Given public debate over how universities should conduct
disciplinary proceedings related to sexual assault, and the Biden
administration’s plan to overhaul Title IX campus sexual assault rules,96
this question will not go away anytime soon.97 Members of the press
and public will continue to request student disciplinary records, and
courts will have to ascertain whether disclosure is required, prohibited,
or discretionary based on FERPA and state open records laws.98
94 See generally Guskiewicz v. DTH Media Corp., 141 S.Ct. 1126 (2021) (denying UNC’s
petition for certiorari).
95 Petition for Writ of Certiorari by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill at 19–
22, Guskiewicz v. DTH Media Corp., 141 S.Ct. 1126 (mem.) (2021) (No. 20-527) [hereinafter
Petition] (“This Court’s review is . . . warranted because the question presented is important and
is likely to generate disparate rules for thousands of colleges and universities across the
country . . . . [and] involves a recurring issue of federal law . . . generating confusion among
courts . . . .”).
96 Tyler Kingkade, Biden Administration Announces Next Steps in Overhauling Title IX
Campus
Sexual
Assault
Rules,
NBC NEWS (April 6, 2021, 9:00 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/biden-administration-announces-next-stepsoverhauling-title-ix-campus-sexual-n1263113.
97 See Petition, supra note 95, at 22–23 ( “[T]his case is hardly the first that has required a
court to . . . decid[e] ‘where disclosure ends and where confidentiality begins’ under potentially
conflicting state and federal statutory schemes.”) (internal citations omitted). See also PressCitizen Co. v. Univ. of Iowa, 817 N.W.2d 480, 486–87 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Caledonian–Rec.
Publ’g Co. v. Vt. State Coll., 833 A.2d 1273, 1274–76 (Vt. 2003) (providing an extensive overview
of litigation regarding FERPA and public records laws, and noting that “state and federal courts
are sharply divided” in outcomes).
98 The Kentucky Supreme Court recently faced the same scenario after the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in DTH Media Corp.: Members of the University of Kentucky
student-run newspaper requested the University’s files pertaining to allegations of sexual assault
by a faculty member. Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, 620 S.W.3d 43, 47–48 (Ky. 2021). The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the University did not comply with its obligations under the Kentucky
Open Records Act and that it could not withhold the entire investigatory file under FERPA. Id.
at 55–58. It reasoned that FERPA’s protective provisions should be construed narrowly, so that
universities cannot use the law as “an invisibility cloak” for institutional secrecy. Id. at 57.
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Absent a Supreme Court ruling, those decisions will probably continue
to yield a wide range of results. Consequently, this nationwide
patchwork of decisions will leave universities facing “uncertain and
conflicting rules about the extent of their discretion to disclose
education records related to sexual assault proceedings.”99
Fortunately, there are ways to avoid this outcome. One approach
would be for state legislatures to explicitly incorporate FERPA’s
confidentiality requirements into open records laws. Some states
reference federal law in their open records laws, but do not explicitly
discuss FERPA. In Iowa, for example, the state’s open records law
contains language meant to preclude any conflict with federal law that
would lead to revocation of funds. The Iowa Open Records Act
provides:
If it is determined that any provision of this chapter would cause the denial of
funds, services, and essential information from the United States government
which would otherwise definitely be available to an agency of this state, such
provision shall be suspended as to such agency, but only to the extent necessary to
100
prevent denial of such funds, services, or essential information.

When the Iowa Supreme Court addressed a case implicating both
FERPA and the Open Records Act, it relied on this language to
conclude that the Iowa Open Records Act incorporates and “gives
priority” to the non-disclosure rules of FERPA.101 In other words,
because FERPA’s enforcement mechanism is the revocation of federal
funds, the court reasoned that state universities cannot release records
that conflict with FERPA’s protective measures.102 Yet, this is a
circuitous way to address any conflict between the two laws, because
the Open Records Act does not explicitly reference FERPA by name,
nor does it describe which elements of FERPA are incorporated into
the Act.
A better approach would be for states to simply amend their open
records laws to: 1) Explicitly reference FERPA and exempt any records
subject to its protection; and 2) Reiterate that these state laws do not
eliminate the discretion conferred by FERPA. This approach would
resolve any ambiguity faced by state courts in cases where FERPA
seems to conflict with state law. Alternatively, Congress could be the
one to take action, and could amend FERPA to directly address state
99 See Petition, supra note 95, at 26 (“This Court alone can provide the clarity necessary to
resolve that confusion and ensure that universities across the United States know exactly what
their obligations are moving forward.”).
100 IOWA CODE § 22.9 (2021).
101 817 N.W.2d at 487–88.
102 817 N.W.2d at 487–88.
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open records laws. There are two ways Congress could make this
change.
First, Congress could make clear that the disciplinary records
provision confers universities discretion to not disclose records related
to sexual assault disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding state open
records laws.103 In this case, preemption would be explicit. Yet, to
prevent universities from using FERPA as a shield against disclosure
of merely embarrassing or unfavorable information,104 Congress could
require universities give sufficient reasons for nondisclosure subject to
in camera review by a federal court.
This approach would be beneficial for a few reasons. First, absent a
Supreme Court ruling, amendment of federal law is the most efficient
way to uniformly resolve the issue. Second, this approach would reflect
the dual purposes of FERPA: Its primary purpose of safeguarding
student privacy, and its secondary purpose of discouraging institutional
secrecy with minimal impact on public interest in open access. State
laws would still largely allow public access to government documents,
but leave the limited category of student disciplinary records related to
sexual assault subject to presumptive university discretion. And that
discretion, if challenged, would still be subject to judicial review.
The second approach would be for Congress to amend FERPA to
codify the balance-of-interests approach. Congress could provide that
FERPA gives universities discretion over disclosure of sexual assault
disciplinary records, unless an overriding public interest exists.105 This
statutory scheme would establish a presumption in favor of university
discretion, with an exception for particularly newsworthy or important
public information. Congress could also specify that certain kinds of
information are so sensitive that they must be redacted even if a

103 The proposed language would be placed in 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6)(B).
104 See, e.g., Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, 620 S.W.3d 43, 57 (Ky. 2021) (“The FERPA
‘education record’ exclusion was clearly not intended as an ‘invisibility cloak’ that can be used to
shield any document that involves or is associated in some way with a student.”); Zach Greenberg
& Adam Goldstein, Baking Common Sense into the FERPA Cake: How to Meaningfully Protect
Student Rights and the Public Interest, 44 J. LEGIS. 22, 39 (2017) (arguing that universities use
FERPA “as a sword to curtail government transparency” by withholding information that was
never private).
105 This approach reflects the Montana Supreme Court in both Krakauer v. State ex rel.
Christian, 381 P.3d 524 (Mont. 2016), and Krakauer v. State ex rel. Comm’r of Higher Educ., 445
P.3d 201, 207, 212 (Mont. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 1107 (mem.) (2020). Like in the Montana
approach, judges would conduct in camera review of the disputed records to make this balanceof-interests determination. See 381 P.3d at 540 (requiring the district court on remand to conduct
an in camera review of the records as part of its balancing of competing interests).
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university discloses them, regardless of newsworthiness.
There would be several benefits to this approach. Courts are wellequipped to conduct this kind of balance-of-interests analysis. They
perform balancing tests all the time under various statutes; even most
state open records laws require such analysis to construe privacy
exemptions.106 In addition, as recognized by the Montana Supreme
Court, unique privacy and access issues involved with allegations of
sexual assault and misconduct make a contextual, case-by-case
approach proper: Rape culture on college campuses is an issue of
“increasing public interest and concern,” as is Title IX compliance.107
But on the other side of the coin rests the privacy interests students
have in keeping these records, which contain sensitive information that
could have severe reputational, emotional, and safety implications for
both alleged perpetrators and victims.108 In camera review by courts
would ensure that these sensitive and context-specific determinations
take into account all of the interests involved.109 Amending FERPA to
instruct courts to balance these interests would promote uniformity
while allowing for the contextual, case-by-case adjudication that these
situations often warrant.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in DTH Media Corp.
v. Folt is particularly problematic as a matter of statutory interpretation.
But as this Note has illustrated, there are several analytical approaches
courts could take to better harmonize and reconcile FERPA with state
open records laws. North Carolina is not alone among states that have
struggled—and will continue to struggle—reconciling FERPA with
their own open records laws in the context of sexual assault disciplinary
proceedings. The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to provide guidance
leaves state legislatures and Congress as the ideal legislative bodies to
intervene and provide clear rights and obligations for both universities
and the public when this situation arises.

106 See discussion supra note 36 and accompanying text (mentioning several different state
applications of the balancing test).
107 381 P.3d at 540.
108 Id. at 540–41.
109 See id. at 542 (“We have recognized the efficacy of an in camera review of requested
records by a district court to ensure that privacy interests are protected.”). The court also noted
that “it is proper for a district court to conduct such an in camera inspection in order to balance
the privacy rights of all the individuals involved in the case against the public’s right to know.” Id.
(quoting Jefferson Cnty. v. Mont. Standard, 79 P.3d 805, 809 (Mont. 2003)).

